San Diego State University California Budgeting Discussion

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Budget Challenge Activity reflection
Complete the California Budget Challenge online at: https://www.budgetchallenge.org/pages/home (Links to an external site.)
Reflect on how our readings/discussion thus far on policy tools and policy implementation played out during the Budget Challenge Activity.
What policy tools did you choose?
What were the potential political costs of certain policy tool choices?
How did those costs affect your decisions? 

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Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy
Author(s): Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, (Jun., 1993), pp. 334-347
Published by: American Political Science Association
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American Political Science Review
Vol. 87, No. 2 June 1993
SOCIAL
OFTARGET
CONSTRUCTION
POPULATIONS:
IMPLICATIONS
FORPOLITICS
ANDPOLICY
ANNE SCHNEIDER
HELEN
1
INGRAM
7e argue
A4
Arizona State University
University of Arizona
that the social
construction
of target
populations
is an important,
albeit
overlooked, political phenomenon that should take its place in the study of public policy by
V v political scientists. The theory contends that social constructions influence the policy
agenda and the selection of policy tools, as well as the rationales that legitimate policy choices.
Constructions become embedded in policy as messages that are absorbed by citizens and affect their
orientations and participation. The theory is important because it helps explain why some groups are
advantaged more than others independently of traditional notions of political power and how policy
designs reinforce or alter such advantages. An understanding of social constructions of target
populations augments conventional hypotheses about the dynamics of policy change, the determination of beneficiaries and losers, the reasons for differing levels and types of participation among target
groups, and the role of policy in democracy.
|fjj

ontemporarypolitical scientists consider many
variables to be significantpolitical phenomena
that previously were viewed either as irrelevant or as the proper domain of another discipline.
The importance of gender in understanding political
behavior and the role of money and media in politics
are examples. Although the question of who benefits
or loses from policy has long been interesting to
political science, most other dimensions of policy
designs have been considered the purview of economists, lawyers, and other specialists. With the emergence of public policy as a major subfield of political
science, however, attention has turned to new aspects of the policy process, such as agenda setting,
formulation, implementation, and consequences,
(Arnold 1990; Ingram and Schneider 1991; Kingdon
1984;Lipsky and Smith 1989;Mazmanianand Sabatier 1983;Rose 1991;Smith and Stone 1988;Pressman
and Wildavsky 1973)as well as additionalelements of
policy design, such as goals, tools, rules and target
populations (Ingramand Schneider 1992;Linderand
Peters 1985; Ostrom 1990; Schneider and Ingram
1990a, 1990b; Stone 1988). We argue that the social
construction of target populations is an important,
albeit overlooked, political phenomenon that should
take its place in the study of public policy by political
scientists.
The social constructionof target populations refers
to the culturalcharacterizationsor popular images of
the persons or groups whose behaviorand well-being
are affectedby public policy. These characterizations
are normative and evaluative, portraying groups in
positive or negative terms through symbolic language, metaphors, and stories (Edelman1964, 1988).
A great deal has been written (mostly by sociologists)
about social constructions of social problems (Best
1989; Spector and Kitsuse 1987). The more specific
topic of social construction of target populations is
importantto politicalscience because it contributesto
C
334
studies of agenda setting, legislative behavior, and
policy formulationand design, as well as to studies of
citizen orientation, conception of citizenship, and
style of participation.
Our theory contends that the social constructionof
targetpopulations has a powerful influence on public
officials and shapes both the policy agenda and the
actualdesign of policy. Thereare strong pressures for
public officialsto provide beneficial policy to powerful, positively constructed target populations and to
devise punitive, punishment-orientedpolicy for negatively constructed groups. Social constructions become embedded in policy as messages that are absorbed by citizens and affect their orientations and
participationpatterns. Policy sends messages about
what government is supposed to do, which citizens
are deserving (and which not), and what kinds of
attitudes and participatorypatterns are appropriate
in a democraticsociety. Differenttarget populations,
however, receive quite different messages. Policies
that have detrimentalimpacts on, or are ineffectivein
solving important problems for, certain types of target populations may not produce citizen participation
directed toward policy change because the messages
received by these target populations encourage withdrawal or passivity. Other target populations, however, receive messages that encourage them to combat policies detrimental to them through various
avenues of political participation.
The theory is important because it helps explain
why some groups are advantaged more than others
independently of traditional notions of political
power and how policy designs can reinforce or alter
such advantages. Further, the theory resolves some
long-standing puzzles political scientists have encountered in attempting to answer Lasswell’s question, “Who gets what, when, and how?” (Lasswell
1936).The theory returnspublic policy to center-stage
in the study of politics, offering an alternative that
Vol. 87, No. 2
American Political Science Review
goes beyond both the pluralist and the microeconomic perspectives.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
TARGET POPULATIONS
A theory that connects social constructions of target
populations to other political phenomena needs definitions of target populations and of social constructions, an explanation of how social constructions
influence public officialsin choosing the agendas and
designs of policy, and an explanation of how policy
agendas and designs influence the political orientatioxisand participationpatternsof targetpopulations.
Conceptualizing Targets and Constructions
Targetpopulation is a concept from the policy design
literaturethat directs attention to the fact that policy
is purposeful and attempts to achieve goals by changing people’s behavior (see our earlier work, Ingram
and Schneider 1991). Policy sets forth problems to be
solved or goals to be achieved and identifies the
people whose behavior is linked to the achievement
of desired ends. Behavioral change is sought by
enabling or coercing people to do things they would
not have done otherwise. By specifying eligibility
criteria, policy creates the boundaries of target populations. Such groups may or may not have a valuebased culturalimage, however. Therefore, they may
or may not carry out any social construction.
The social constructionof a targetpopulation refers
to (1) the recognitionof the shared characteristicsthat
distinguish a target population as socially meaningful, and (2) the attribution of specific, valence-oriented values, symbols, and images to the characteristics. Social constructions are stereotypes about
particulargroups of people that have been createdby
politics, culture, socialization, history, the media,
literature, religion, and the like. Positive constructions include images such as “deserving,” “intelligent,” “honest,” “public-spirited,” and so forth.
Negative constructions include images such as “undeserving,” “stupid,” “dishonest,” and “selfish.”
There are a wide variety of evaluative dimensions,
both positive and negative, that can be used to
portraygroups.
Social constructions are often conflicting and subject to contention. Policy directed at persons whose
income falls below the officialpoverty level identifies
a specific set of persons. The social constructions
could portray them as disadvantaged people whose
poverty is not their fault or as lazy persons who are
benefitting from other peoples’ hard work. On the
other hand, not all target populations even have a
well-defined social construction. Motor vehicle policies identify automobile drivers as a target population; but these persons have no particular social
construction, at this time. Policies directed at drunk
335
driversor teenage drivers, however, have identified a
subset that carriesa negative valence.
The actual social constructions of target groups, as
well as how widely shared the constructions are, are
matters for empiricalanalysis. Social constructionsof
target populations are measurable, empirical, phenomena. Data can be generated by the study of texts,
such as legislative histories, statutes, guidelines,
speeches, media coverage, and analysis of the symbols contained therein. Social constructions also can
be ascertained from interviews or surveys of policymakers, media representatives, members of the general public, and persons within the target group
itself.
One of the major contentions of some social constructionists(sometimes called strict-constructionists)
is that there is no objective reality but only the
construction itself (Spector and Kitsuse 1987, J.
Schneider 1985). Those who make this argument
contend that research should focus on the constructions, not on the reasons the constructions have
arisen or how constructions differ from objective
reality. The point of view adopted here, however, is
more like that expressed by Edelman (1988) and
Collins (1989). Target populations are assumed to
have boundaries that are empirically verifiable (indeed, policies create these empiricalboundaries) and
to exist within objective conditions even though
those conditions are subject to multiple evaluations.
One of the important issues for analysis is to understand how social constructionsemerge from objective
conditions and how each changes.
Social Constructions and Elected Officials
Researchhas uncovered a number of important motivations for elected officials (Arnold 1990; Kelman
1987;Kingdon 1984). Two of the most important are
to produce public policies that will assist in their
reelection and that will be effective in addressing
widely acknowledged public problems. Social constructions are relevant for both of these considerations.
Social constructions become part of the reelection
calculus when public officials anticipate the reaction
of the target population itself to the policy and also
anticipatethe reactionof others to whether the target
group shouldbe the beneficiary (or loser) for a particular policy proposal (Wilson1986).Thus, the electoral
implication of a policy proposal depends partly on
the power of the targetpopulation itself (construedas
votes, wealth, and propensity of the group to mobilize for action) but also on the extent to which others
will approve or disapprove of the policy’s being
directed toward a particulartarget.
The convergence of power and social constructions
creates four types of target populations, as displayed
in Figure 1. Advantaged groups are perceived to be
both powerful and positively constructed, such as the
elderly and business. Contenders, such as unions
and the rich, are powerful but negatively constructed, usually as undeserving. Dependents might
Construction of Target Populations
June 1993
Social Constructions and Political Power: Types of
Target Populations
Constructions
0
X
co
Positive
Negative
Advantaged
Contenders
The elderly
Business
Veterans
Scientists
The rich
Big unions
Minorities
Culturalelites
Moralmajority
Dependents
Children
Mothers
Disabled
Deviants
Criminals
Drugaddicts
Communists
Flag burners
Gangs
include children or mothers and are considered to be
politically weak, but they carry generally positive
constructions. Deviants, such as criminals,are in the
worst situation, since they are both weak and negatively constructed. Public officials find it to their
advantage to provide beneficial policy to the advantaged groups who are both powerful and positively
constructed as “deserving”because not only will the
group itself respond favorably but others will approve of the beneficial policy’s being conferred on
deserving people. Similarly, public officials commonly inflict punishment on negatively constructed
groups who have little or no power, because they
need fear no electoralretaliationfrom the group itself
and the general public approves of punishment for
groups that it has constructed negatively. Figure 1
shows other examples of how a hypothetical elected
official might array a variety of target populations
within these dimensions.
Some social constructions may remain constant
over a long period of time, as have the prevailing
constructions of criminalsor communists;but others
are subjectto continual debate and manipulation.For
instance, persons with AIDS are constructedby some
as deviants, little better than criminalswho are being
punished through disease for their sins. The identificationof children, hemophiliacs, heterosexuals, and
MagicJohnson as victims, however, has made possible a different construction. Public officials realize
that target groups can be identified and described so
as to influence the social construction.Hence, a great
deal of the politicalmaneuveringin the establishment
of policy agendas and in the design of policy pertains
to the specificationof the target populations and the
type of image that can be created for them.
Social constructionsmay become so widely shared
that they are extremely difficultto refute even by the
336
small number of persons who might disagree with
them. Other constructions, however, are in contention. Officials develop maps of target populations
based on both the stereotypes they themselves hold
and those they believe to prevailamong that segment
of the public likely to become important to them.
Competing officialschampion differentconstructions
of the same groups. Some view minorities as oppressed populations and argue for policies appropriate to dependent people, whereas others portray
minorities as powerful special interests and not deserving of government aid. Politicaldebates may lead
elected officials to make finer and finer distinctions,
thereby subdividing a particular group into those
who are deserving and those who are not. Immigration policy, for example, distinguishes among illegal
aliens, refugees, migrantworkers, those seeking asylum, and highly skilled workers who receive waivers.
There has been no research on the social constructions of target populations from the perspective of
elected officials;thus, there is no way to speculate on
how Figure 1 actually should be drawn and how
much agreement there would be about the placement
of various groups.
Public officialsare sensitive not only to power and
social construction but also to pressure from the
public and from professionals to produce effective
public policies (Arnold 1990; Kelman 1987; Quade
1982). Public officials must explain and justify their
policy positions to the electorate by articulating a
vision of the public interest and then showing how a
proposed policy is logicallyconnected to these widely
shared public values (Arnold 1990; Habermas 1975;
Offe 1985). They need to have a believable causal
logic connecting the various aspects of the policy
design to desired outcomes.
Social constructions of target populations become
importantin the policy effectiveness calculusbecause
elected officials have to pay attention to the logical
connection between the target groups and the goals
that might be achieved. Elected officialsmay emphasize some goals rather than others because target
populations that they wish to benefit or burden have
credible linkages to the goals (Edelman 1988; Kingdon 1984). On the other hand, elected officials are
able to construct several different policy logics for
almost any problem they wish to solve. For example,
most would agree that reduction in the infant mortality rate in the United States is a worthy goal.
However, to achieve this, the United States could
provide direct health care benefits to high-risk pregnant women, it could mandate reductions in carcinogens that presumably increase risk, or it could
criminalize drug and alcohol use by pregnant
women. All of these could be justified as contributing
to a reduced infant mortalityrate;but they have very
different implications for target populations, especially pregnant women who could either be the
beneficiary of the policy or could bear exceptional
costs because of it. Economic vitality is another example of a widely shared public goal for which a
credible case could be made for policies that serve
American Political Science Review
Vol. 87, No. 2
ants will receive too little beneficial policy. Burdens
will become oversubscribed especially to deviants
and undersubscribedto the advantaged groups. For
public officialsto realize their ambitions of reelection
and the development of effective, public-oriented
policy, they have to take into account not only the
power and social constructions of target populations
but also the logical connection of the potential target
groups to the goals. Most of the time, public officials
try to bring these three factors into congruence. It is
important to notice that congruence is possible only
in two segments of the policy box shown in Figure 2.
One is to provide beneficial policy to powerful,
positively viewed groups who are logically connected
to an important public purpose. The second area of
congruence is found at the back of the box: to provide
punishment policies to negatively constructed, powerless groups, who are linked logically to a broader
public purpose. All other areas produce noncongruence of some type.
Powerful segments of the population who also
have relatively consensual positive social constructions (the advantaged groups) have considerablecontrol and will find it easy to get their issues on
legislative agendas. They will be the recipient of
much beneficial policy. Advantaged groups have the
resources and capacity to shape their own constructions and to combat attempts that would portray
them negatively. The easiest problems for elected
officials to address will be those for which advantaged segments of the population are the logical
recipients of beneficial policy. These groups will
receive beneficial policy, however, even if the causal
linkages to some ostensible common or public purpose lack credibility or are entirely absent. The advantaged groups will often be chosen as first-order
(proximate)targets even when others would be more
logical or efficient. Direct government subsidies to
large corporations, for example, have been granted
by governments for the ostensible purpose of increasing the number of jobs in the community, although
such funds may have created more jobs if directed
toward public-sector agencies with lower management salaries and overhead. Beneficialpolicy for the
advantaged groups will be oversubscribed in the
sense that there will be more positive rules and more
expenditures in this area than can be justified either
on technical grounds of policy effectiveness or on
representational grounds of policy responsiveness
that is proportional to the group’s size and other
political resources.
The attractivenessof policy directed toward powerless people with negative images (the deviants) is
surprisinglysimilarexcept that the deviants are punished and have almost no control over the agenda or
the designs. Policies will be high on the legislative
agenda, especially during election campaigns. Negatively constructed powerless groups will usually be
proximate targets of punishment policy, and the
extent of burdens will be greater (oversubscribed)
than is needed to achieve effective results. The negative social constructions make it likely that these
Variations in How Policy Treats Target
Populations: Allocation of Benefits and Burdens
Constructions
Positive
/
/
.
Z
trek@
/
Advantaged
High control;
Burdens are
undersubscribed
Some control;:
Burdens are /
symbolic and overt
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Negative
Contenders
: 0
;:;; tODependents
No control;
Burdens are
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DeviantW
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Burdensyery
oversubscribed
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Negative
Advantaged
Contenders
Highcontrol;
Benefitsare
Lowcontrol;
Benefitsare
oversubscribed
subrosa
Dependents
Lowcontrol;
Benefitsare
undersubscribed
Deviants
No control;
Benefitsvery
undersubscribed
g
D
/
0
w
3
Note:Benefitsare shownon thefrontpartof the boxto eachtypeoftarget,
burdensare shownat the backofthe box.
widely divergent interests. Some policy options
would give direct benefits to jobless or low-income
persons, whereas other options would redistribute
wealth to the poor, thereby increasing demand for
products. Others would offer tax breaks, loans, or
outright grants to the owners of businesses to increase their competitive position or to entice them to
move into a location (or to retain those who are
threatening to leave). In almost any policy area there
are multiple logics that involve different target populations and/or different roles for target groups.
Thus, even when public officials are pursuing widely
held public interest goals, they are commonly able to
provide benefits to powerful, positively constructed
groups and burdens to less powerful, negatively
constructed ones.
Benefits, Burdens, and Target Populations
The dynamic interaction of power and social constructions leads to a distinctive pattern in the allocation of benefits and burdens to the different types of
target groups (Figure 2). The front of the box shows
how benefits are allocated, and the back shows the
allocation of burdens. Benefits are expected to become oversubscribed to advantaged populations (i.e.,
these groups will receive more beneficial policy than
is warranted either in terms of policy effectiveness or
representativeness), whereas dependents and devi-
337
June 1993
Construction of Target Populations
groups will often receive burdens even when it is
illogical from the perspective of policy effectiveness.
The highly predictable popularity of tough criminal
justice statutes over which deviants have no control,
such as the 1991 federal crime bill, are vivid illustrations of the political attractiveness of punishment
directed at powerless, negatively viewed groups.
Important public issues do not always permit
elected officials to find congruence among social
constructions, power, and logical connections to
goals; and problems cannot always be solved so
straightforwardly. Many officials care about outcomes and fear widespread public reaction against
ineffective policy, lack of attention to importantproblems, and too much favoritism to special interests.
They may confront these contradictions through
strenuous efforts to keep such issues off the agenda,
or they may manipulatethe image of target groups in
an effort to change their social construction. In some
instances, they simply bear the political costs of
inflicting burdens on positively viewed groups or
grantingbenefits to those who are negatively viewed.
Not uncommonly, public officials engage in private
politics or outright deception.
The case of powerful but negatively viewed groups
(the contenders) presents numerous problems. Public
officialswill prefer policy that grants benefits noticed
only by members of the target groups and largely
hidden from everyone else. They will prefer policies
that the public and media believe inflict burdens on
powerful, negative groups but that actuallyhave few,
if any, negative effects. Contenders have sufficient
control to blunt the imposition of burdens but not
enough power to gain much in terms of visible
benefits. Statutes directed toward these contending
groups will be complex and vague. It may be difficult
to discern from the statute who the policy favors or
hinders because discretion and responsibility will
often be passed on to lower-level agencies and governments. Context will become especially important.
For example, policy characteristicsfor contending
groups may depend on the extent of media and
public attention, as well as variationin the cohesiveness and activity of the target group. During times of
low public attention and high levels of group activity,
policy will tend to be beneficial, although relatively
low in visibility and still undersubscribedin terms of
what might be needed to actually solve particular
problems. When public attention increases (as it is
likely to do when an unpopulargroup is cohesive and
active), then policy may shift more toward the burdensome side.
For the dependent groups, such as children or
mothers, officials want to appear to be aligned with
their interests;but their lack of politicalpower makes
it difficultto direct resources toward them. Symbolic
policies permit elected leaders to show great concern
but relieve them of the need to allocate resources.
Policies in this area tend to be left to lower levels of
government or to the private sector. The benefits
dependents receive are passed down by other agents,
and dependents have little control over the design of
338
the policies. In the United States, women and children have dominated this category, with women
moving more toward a position of power (and less
positively viewed) as they have become more organized and more active in the economic sector; and
people in these groups have been viewed as the
responsibility of families, churches, and the private
sector. Feminist writers, in fact, view the artificial
separationof the public and private spheres as one of
the key problems faced by women in advanced
industrial democracies (agger 1983).
Another type of noncongruence occurs when legislators are attempting to inflict regulations or costs
on powerful, popular groups. These situations also
will be undersubscribedand highly contentious. For
example, it is difficultto generate support for burdensome regulations of positively viewed businesses
because the proximate target groups will oppose the
policies vigorously and argue that the chain of effects
is not likely to produce the desired results anyway; or
they may argue that other groups are more logical
targets and would have a greater impact and if
chosen. The secondary or remote target groups that
will presumablybenefit from the regulationsmay not
provide as much support as expected, because of the
uncertaintythat the cause-and-effectlogic within the
policy is correct(Arnold 1990). In a similarway, it is
difficultfor elected leaders to provide beneficial policy to the powerless, negatively viewed groups (such
as providing rehabilitationprograms for criminals),
despite the fact that these policies may be more
effective than those that involve punishment or may
be less costly than the death penalty, given the
extensive appeals that ensue. The electoral costs are
extensive, as it is a simple matter to accuse a public
officialof being “soft on crime.” Much of the beneficial policy achieved by the powerless, negatively
constructed target groups has been through court
actions and court mandates to ensure their rights.
Social Constructions and Policy Tools
The emerging literatureon policy design emphasizes
that the attributesof statutes, guidelines, implementation structures, and direct service delivery processes are important to an understanding of the
policy process. There is considerableinterest in why
some designs are chosen, rather than others, and
what differencesthese choices make in policy impacts
on target populations (Dryzek 1990; Ingram and
Schneider 1991; Linder and Peters 1985; Lipsky and
Smith 1989; Salamon and Lun 1989; Schneider and
Ingram 1990a; Smith and Stone 1988). The theory
advanced here contends that some elements of design (especially the policy tools and the policy rationales) will differ depending on the social construction
and political power of the target population.
Policy tools refer to the aspects of policy intended
to motivate the target populations to comply with
policy or to utilize policy opportunities (Schneider
and Ingram 1990b). For groups that are constructed
as deserving, intelligent, and public-spirited(as we
Vol. 87, No. 2
American PoliticalScience Review
expect the powerful, positively viewed groups to be),
the policy tools will emphasize capacity building,
inducements, and techniques that enable the target
population to learn about the results of its behavior
and take appropriate action on a voluntary basis.
When delivering beneficial policy to the advantaged
groups, certain types of capacity-buildingtools are
expected to be commonly used, especially direct
provision of such resources as entitlements or nonincome-tested subsidies, and also of free information,
training, and technical assistance. The political payoffs for providing beneficial policy to these groups is
such that outreach programs will be common: the
agencies will seek out all eligible persons and encourage them to utilize the policy opportunities that have
been made available (Ingramand Schneider 1991).
When burdens, ratherthan benefits, are directed at
the advantaged groups, the tools will be less predictable and more likely to change; but self-regulation
that entrusts the group to learn from its own behavior
and voluntarily take actions to achieve policy goals
will be preferred, along with positive inducements.
When these are not effective in inducing the desired
behavior, policies may shift toward “standards and
charges,” which do not stigmatize the organization
for its activities but simply attempt to discourage
certain actions (such as pollution) by charging for it.
Sanctions and force are not likely to be used in
connection with powerful, positively viewed groups.
Policy tools for dependent groups (such as mothers
or children) are expected to be somewhat different.
Subsidies will be given, but eligibility requirements
often involve labeling and stigmatizing recipients.
Subsidies to farmersdo not requireincome tests, for
example; but college students must prove that they
are needy and without resources. Outreachprograms
will be less common, and many programswill require
clients to present themselves to the agency in orderto
receive benefits. Welfare programs even for persons
perceived as deserving, such as college students, the
disabled, or the unemployed, usually do not seek out
eligible persons but rely on those who are eligible to
make their case to the agency itself.
Symbolic and hortatory tools will commonly be
used for dependent groups even when the pervasiveness of the problem would suggest that more direct
intervention is needed. Groups in the dependent
category will not usually be encouraged or given
support to devise their own solutions to problemsbut
will have to rely on agencies to help them. For
example, battered women still must rely mainly on
the police for assistance, ratherthan h