Pasadena City College Great Depression & Recession Economics Paper

Description

Choose one of the options below and write a thoughtful essay of 1000-1200 words that draws on multiple readings and lectures from this semester. You should cite the readings and lectures used in your essay. Any class sources can be cited very briefly (e.g., title or author or lecture #). Outside sources must be cited in full according to a standard citation style (APA, MLA, Chicago, etc.). Essays that go over 1200 words by more than 10% will face a length penalty. Essays that are under 1000 will not be directly penalized but likely do not reflect sufficient engagement with course materials to warrant a high grade. (You don’t need to worry about the cite, I will find it) Some reading files are attached if you can cite 1-2 from that will be bonus and tip more.1. Write a letter explaining three things you have learned about the “History of American Capitalism” this semester. The three “things” should be substantial themes or takeaways relating to course lectures and readings, and you should their significance clearly. Your letter should be addressed to a specific person–this can be someone you know (a relative or friend) or a specific historical or present day figure. 2. How have the challenges of regulating national and multinational businesses changed over the course of American history? Your answer must explore the period since the U.S. Civil War and discuss at least two specific firms covered in the class. However, if you wish, you may take up a longer time period as long as at least half of your essay draws on course material covered after the Midquiz. 3. During the twentieth century, two crises–the Great Depression of the 1930s and the recession of the 1970s–led Americans to reimagine the path forward for capitalism. Describe the contours of each crisis as well as some of the major resulting policy changes. In the conclusion of your essay, consider the possibilities and limitations you see for our current crisis to create new visions for the American economy. Please note that at least 2/3 of your essay should focus on the historical discussion before moving to the present moment. 4. You may also answer the question you posed above. But be sure to draw on multiple lectures and readings if you choose to do so.

15 attachmentsSlide 1 of 15attachment_1attachment_1attachment_2attachment_2attachment_3attachment_3attachment_4attachment_4attachment_5attachment_5attachment_6attachment_6attachment_7attachment_7attachment_8attachment_8attachment_9attachment_9attachment_10attachment_10attachment_11attachment_11attachment_12attachment_12attachment_13attachment_13attachment_14attachment_14attachment_15attachment_15.slider-slide > img { width: 100%; display: block; }
.slider-slide > img:focus { margin: auto; }

Unformatted Attachment Preview

The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits
by Milton Friedman
The New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970. Copyright @ 1970 by The New York Times Company.
When I hear businessmen speak eloquently about the “social responsibilities of business in a free-enterprise
system,” I am reminded of the wonderful line about the Frenchman who discovered at the age of 70 that he had
been speaking prose all his life. The businessmen believe that they are defending free en-terprise when they
declaim that business is not concerned “merely” with profit but also with promoting desirable “social” ends; that
business has a “social conscience” and takes seriously its responsibilities for providing em-ployment,
eliminating discrimination, avoid-ing pollution and whatever else may be the catchwords of the contemporary
crop of re-formers. In fact they are–or would be if they or anyone else took them seriously–preach-ing pure and
unadulterated socialism. Busi-nessmen who talk this way are unwitting pup-pets of the intellectual forces that
have been undermining the basis of a free society these past decades.
The discussions of the “social responsibili-ties of business” are notable for their analytical looseness and lack of
rigor. What does it mean to say that “business” has responsibilities? Only people can have responsibilities. A
corporation is an artificial person and in this sense may have artificial responsibilities, but “business” as a whole
cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in this vague sense. The first step toward clarity in examining the
doctrine of the social responsibility of business is to ask precisely what it implies for whom.
Presumably, the individuals who are to be responsible are businessmen, which means in-dividual proprietors or
corporate executives. Most of the discussion of social responsibility is directed at corporations, so in what
follows I shall mostly neglect the individual proprietors and speak of corporate executives.
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the
business. He has direct re-sponsibility to his employers. That responsi-bility is to conduct the business in
accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while con-forming to
the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom. Of course, in
some cases his employers may have a different objective. A group of persons might establish a corporation for
an eleemosynary purpose–for exam-ple, a hospital or a school. The manager of such a corporation will not have
money profit as his objective but the rendering of certain services.
In either case, the key point is that, in his capacity as a corporate executive, the manager is the agent of the
individuals who own the corporation or establish the eleemosynary institution, and his primary responsibility is
to them.
Needless to say, this does not mean that it is easy to judge how well he is performing his task. But at least the
criterion of performance is straightforward, and the persons among whom a voluntary contractual arrangement
exists are clearly defined.
Of course, the corporate executive is also a person in his own right. As a person, he may have many other
responsibilities that he rec-ognizes or assumes voluntarily–to his family, his conscience, his feelings of charity,
his church, his clubs, his city, his country. He ma}. feel impelled by these responsibilities to de-vote part of his
income to causes he regards as worthy, to refuse to work for particular corpo-rations, even to leave his job, for
example, to join his country’s armed forces. Ifwe wish, we may refer to some of these responsibilities as “social
responsibilities.” But in these respects he is acting as a principal, not an agent; he is spending his own money or
time or energy, not the money of his employers or the time or energy he has contracted to devote to their
purposes. If these are “social responsibili-ties,” they are the social responsibilities of in-dividuals, not of
business.
What does it mean to say that the corpo-rate executive has a “social responsibility” in his capacity as
businessman? If this statement is not pure rhetoric, it must mean that he is to act in some way that is not in the
interest of his employers. For example, that he is to refrain from increasing the price of the product in order to
contribute to the social objective of preventing inflation, even though a price in crease would be in the best
interests of the corporation. Or that he is to make expendi-tures on reducing pollution beyond the amount that is
in the best interests of the cor-poration or that is required by law in order to contribute to the social objective of
improving the environment. Or that, at the expense of corporate profits, he is to hire “hardcore” un-employed
instead of better qualified available workmen to contribute to the social objective of reducing poverty.
In each of these cases, the corporate exec-utive would be spending someone else’s money for a general social
interest. Insofar as his actions in accord with his “social responsi-bility” reduce returns to stockholders, he is
spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise the price to customers, he is spending the customers’ money.
Insofar as his actions lower the wages of some employees, he is spending their money.
The stockholders or the customers or the employees could separately spend their own money on the particular
action if they wished to do so. The executive is exercising a distinct “social responsibility,” rather than serving
as an agent of the stockholders or the customers or the employees, only if he spends the money in a different
way than they would have spent it.
But if he does this, he is in effect imposing taxes, on the one hand, and deciding how the tax proceeds shall be
spent, on the other.
This process raises political questions on two levels: principle and consequences. On the level of political
principle, the imposition of taxes and the expenditure of tax proceeds are gov-ernmental functions. We have
established elab-orate constitutional, parliamentary and judicial provisions to control these functions, to assure
that taxes are imposed so far as possible in ac-cordance with the preferences and desires of the public–after all,
“taxation without repre-sentation” was one of the battle cries of the American Revolution. We have a system of
checks and balances to separate the legisla-tive function of imposing taxes and enacting expenditures from the
executive function of collecting taxes and administering expendi-ture programs and from the judicial function
of mediating disputes and interpreting the law.
Here the businessman–self-selected or appointed directly or indirectly by stockhold-ers–is to be simultaneously
legislator, execu-tive and, jurist. He is to decide whom to tax by how much and for what purpose, and he is to
spend the proceeds–all this guided only by general exhortations from on high to restrain inflation, improve the
environment, fight poverty and so on and on.
The whole justification for permitting the corporate executive to be selected by the stockholders is that the
executive is an agent serving the interests of his principal. This jus-tification disappears when the corporate
ex-ecutive imposes taxes and spends the pro-ceeds for “social” purposes. He becomes in effect a public
employee, a civil servant, even though he remains in name an employee of a private enterprise. On grounds of
political principle, it is intolerable that such civil ser-vants–insofar as their actions in the name of social
responsibility are real and not just win-dow-dressing–should be selected as they are now. If they are to be civil
servants, then they must be elected through a political process. If they are to impose taxes and make
expendi-tures to foster “social” objectives, then politi-cal machinery must be set up to make the as-sessment of
taxes and to determine through a political process the objectives to be served.
This is the basic reason why the doctrine of “social responsibility” involves the acceptance of the socialist view
that political mechanisms, not market mechanisms, are the appropriate way to determine the allocation of scarce
re-sources to alternative uses.
On the grounds of consequences, can the corporate executive in fact discharge his al-leged “social
responsibilities?” On the other hand, suppose he could get away with spending the stockholders’ or customers’
or employees’ money. How is he to know how to spend it? He is told that he must contribute to fighting
inflation. How is he to know what ac-tion of his will contribute to that end? He is presumably an expert in
running his company–in producing a product or selling it or financing it. But nothing about his selection makes
him an expert on inflation. Will his hold- ing down the price of his product reduce infla-tionary pressure? Or, by
leaving more spending power in the hands of his customers, simply divert it elsewhere? Or, by forcing him to
produce less because of the lower price, will it simply contribute to shortages? Even if he could an-swer these
questions, how much cost is he justi-fied in imposing on his stockholders, customers and employees for this
social purpose? What is his appropriate share and what is the appropri-ate share of others?
And, whether he wants to or not, can he get away with spending his stockholders’, cus-tomers’ or employees’
money? Will not the stockholders fire him? (Either the present ones or those who take over when his actions in
the name of social responsibility have re-duced the corporation’s profits and the price of its stock.) His
customers and his employees can desert him for other producers and em-ployers less scrupulous in exercising
their so-cial responsibilities.
This facet of “social responsibility” doc- trine is brought into sharp relief when the doctrine is used to justify
wage restraint by trade unions. The conflict of interest is naked and clear when union officials are asked to
subordinate the interest of their members to some more general purpose. If the union offi-cials try to enforce
wage restraint, the consequence is likely to be wildcat strikes, rank–and-file revolts and the emergence of
strong competitors for their jobs. We thus have the ironic phenomenon that union leaders–at least in the U.S.–
have objected to Govern-ment interference with the market far more consistently and courageously than have
business leaders.
The difficulty of exercising “social responsibility” illustrates, of course, the great virtue of private competitive
enterprise–it forces people to be responsible for their own actions and makes it difficult for them to “exploit”
other people for either selfish or unselfish purposes. They can do good–but only at their own expense.
Many a reader who has followed the argu-ment this far may be tempted to remonstrate that it is all well and
good to speak of Government’s having the responsibility to im-pose taxes and determine expenditures for such
“social” purposes as controlling pollu-tion or training the hard-core unemployed, but that the problems are too
urgent to wait on the slow course of political processes, that the exercise of social responsibility by
busi-nessmen is a quicker and surer way to solve pressing current problems.
Aside from the question of fact–I share Adam Smith’s skepticism about the benefits that can be expected from
“those who affected to trade for the public good”–this argument must be rejected on grounds of principle. What
it amounts to is an assertion that those who favor the taxes and expenditures in question have failed to persuade
a majority of their fellow citizens to be of like mind and that they are seeking to attain by undemocratic
procedures what they cannot attain by democratic proce-dures. In a free society, it is hard for “evil” people to do
“evil,” especially since one man’s good is another’s evil.
I have, for simplicity, concentrated on the special case of the corporate executive, ex-cept only for the brief
digression on trade unions. But precisely the same argument ap-plies to the newer phenomenon of calling upon
stockholders to require corporations to exercise social responsibility (the recent G.M crusade for example). In
most of these cases, what is in effect involved is some stockholders trying to get other stockholders (or
customers or employees) to contribute against their will to “social” causes favored by the activists. In-sofar as
they succeed, they are again imposing taxes and spending the proceeds.
The situation of the individual proprietor is somewhat different. If he acts to reduce the returns of his enterprise
in order to exercise his “social responsibility,” he is spending his own money, not someone else’s. If he wishes
to spend his money on such purposes, that is his right, and I cannot see that there is any ob-jection to his doing
so. In the process, he, too, may impose costs on employees and cus-tomers. However, because he is far less
likely than a large corporation or union to have mo-nopolistic power, any such side effects will tend to be
minor.
Of course, in practice the doctrine of social responsibility is frequently a cloak for actions that are justified on
other grounds rather than a reason for those actions.
To illustrate, it may well be in the long run interest of a corporation that is a major employer in a small
community to devote resources to providing amenities to that community or to improving its government. That
may make it easier to attract desirable employees, it may reduce the wage bill or lessen losses from pilferage
and sabotage or have other worthwhile effects. Or it may be that, given the laws about the deductibility of
corporate charitable contributions, the stockholders can contribute more to chari-ties they favor by having the
corporation make the gift than by doing it themselves, since they can in that way contribute an amount that
would otherwise have been paid as corporate taxes.
In each of these–and many similar–cases, there is a strong temptation to rationalize these actions as an exercise
of “social responsibility.” In the present climate of opinion, with its wide spread aversion to “capitalism,”
“profits,” the “soulless corporation” and so on, this is one way for a corporation to generate goodwill as a byproduct of expenditures that are entirely justified in its own self-interest.
It would be inconsistent of me to call on corporate executives to refrain from this hyp-ocritical window-dressing
because it harms the foundations of a free society. That would be to call on them to exercise a “social
re-sponsibility”! If our institutions, and the atti-tudes of the public make it in their self-inter-est to cloak their
actions in this way, I cannot summon much indignation to denounce them. At the same time, I can express
admiration for those individual proprietors or owners of closely held corporations or stockholders of more
broadly held corporations who disdain such tactics as approaching fraud.
Whether blameworthy or not, the use of the cloak of social responsibility, and the nonsense spoken in its name
by influential and presti-gious businessmen, does clearly harm the foun-dations of a free society. I have been
impressed time and again by the schizophrenic character of many businessmen. They are capable of being
extremely farsighted and clearheaded in matters that are internal to their businesses. They are incredibly
shortsighted and muddle-headed in matters that are outside their businesses but affect the possible survival of
busi-ness in general. This shortsightedness is strikingly exemplified in the calls from many businessmen for
wage and price guidelines or controls or income policies. There is nothing that could do more in a brief period
to destroy a market system and replace it by a centrally con-trolled system than effective governmental con-trol
of prices and wages.
The shortsightedness is also exemplified in speeches by businessmen on social respon-sibility. This may gain
them kudos in the short run. But it helps to strengthen the already too prevalent view that the pursuit of profits is
wicked and immoral and must be curbed and controlled by external forces. Once this view is adopted, the
external forces that curb the market will not be the social consciences, however highly developed, of the
pontificating executives; it will be the iron fist of Government bureaucrats. Here, as with price and wage
controls, businessmen seem to me to reveal a suicidal impulse.
The political principle that underlies the market mechanism is unanimity. In an ideal free market resting on
private property, no individual can coerce any other, all coopera-tion is voluntary, all parties to such
coopera-tion benefit or they need not participate. There are no values, no “social” responsibilities in any sense
other than the shared values and responsibilities of individuals. Society is a collection of individuals and of the
various groups they voluntarily form.
The political principle that underlies the political mechanism is conformity. The indi-vidual must serve a more
general social inter-est–whether that be determined by a church or a dictator or a majority. The individual may
have a vote and say in what is to be done, but if he is overruled, he must conform. It is appropriate for some to
require others to contribute to a general social purpose whether they wish to or not.
Unfortunately, unanimity is not always feasible. There are some respects in which conformity appears
unavoidable, so I do not see how one can avoid the use of the political mecha-nism altogether.
But the doctrine of “social responsibility” taken seriously would extend the scope of the political mechanism to
every human activity. It does not differ in philosophy from the most explicitly collectivist doctrine. It differs
only by professing to believe that collectivist ends can be attained without collectivist means. That is why, in
my book Capitalism and Freedom, I have called it a “fundamentally subversive doctrine” in a free society, and
have said that in such a society, “there is one and only one social responsibility of business–to use it resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is
to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.”
!
The Way We Live Now – Walk Away From Your Mortgage! – …
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/magazine/10FOB-wwln-t….
January 10, 2010
THE WAY WE LIVE NOW
Walk Away From Your Mortgage!
By ROGER LOWENSTEIN
John Courson, president and C.E.O. of the Mortgage Bankers Association, recently told The Wall Street
Journal that homeowners who default on their mortgages should think about the “message” they will send
to “their family and their kids and their friends.” Courson was implying that homeowners — record
numbers of whom continue to default — have a responsibility to make good. He wasn’t referring to the
people who have no choice, who can’t afford their payments. He was speaking about the rising number of
folks who are voluntarily choosing not to pay.
Such voluntary defaults are a new phenomenon. Time was, Americans would do anything to pay their
mortgage — forgo a new car or a vacation, even put a younger family member to work. But the housing
collapse left 10.7 million families owing more than their homes are worth. So some of them are making a
calculated decision to hang onto their money and let their homes go. Is this irresponsible?
Businesses — in particular Wall Street banks — make such calculations routinely. Morgan Stanley recently
decided to stop making payments on five San Francisco office buildings. A Morgan Stanley fund purchased
the buildings at the height of the boom, and their value has plunged. Nobody has said Morgan Stanley is
immoral — perhaps because no one assumed it was moral to begin with. But the average American, as if
sprung from some Franklinesque mythology, is supposed to honor his debts, or so says the mortgage
industry as well as government officials. Former Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. declared that
“any homeowner who can afford his mortgage payment but chooses to walk away from an underwater
property is simply a speculator — and one who is not honoring his obligation.” (Paulson presumably was
not so censorious of speculation during his 32-year career at Goldman Sachs.)
The moral suasion has continued under President Obama, who has urged that homeowners follow the
“responsible” course. Indeed, HUD-approved housing counselors are supposed to counsel people against
foreclosure. In many cases, this means counseling people to throw away money. Brent White, a University
of Arizona law professor, notes that a family who bought a three-bedroom home in Salinas, Calif., at the
market top in 2006, with no down payment (then a common-enough occurrence), could theoretically have
to wait 60 years to recover their equity. On the other hand, if they walked, they could rent a similar house
for a pittance of their monthly mortgage.
There are two reasons why so-called strategic defaults have been considered antisocial and perhaps amoral.
One is that foreclosures depress the neighborhood and drive down prices. But in a market society, since
when are people responsible for the economic effects of their actions? Every oil speculator helps to drive up
gasoline prices. Every hedge fund that speculated against a bank by purchasing credit-default swaps on its
1 of 3
12/1/14, 1:30 PM
The Way We Live Now – Walk Away From Your Mortgage! – …
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/magazine/10FOB-wwln-t….
bonds signaled skepticism about the bank’s creditworthiness and helped to make it more costly for the bank
to borrow, and thus to issue loans. We are all economic pinballs, insensibly colliding for better or worse.
The other reason is that default (supposedly) debases the character of the borrower. Once, perhaps, when
bankers held onto mortgages for 30 years, they occupied a moral high ground. These days, lenders typically
unload mortgages within days (or minutes). And not just in mortgage finance, but in virtually every realm of
our transaction-obsessed society, the message is that enduring relationships count for less than the value
put on assets for sale.
Think of private-equity firms that close a factory — essentially deciding that the company is worth more
dead than alive. Or the New York Yankees and their World Series M.V.P. Hideki Matsui, who parted
company as soon as the cheering stopped. Or money-losing hedge-fund managers: rather than try to earn
back their investors’ lost capital, they start new funds so they can rake in fresh incentives. Sam Zell, a
billionaire, let the Tribune Company, which he had previously acquired, file for bankruptcy. Indeed, the
owners of any company that defaults on bonds and chooses to let the company fail rather than invest more
capital in it are practicing “strategic default.” Banks signal their complicity with this ethos when they send
new credit cards to people who failed to stay current on old ones.
Mortgage holders do sign a promissory note, which is a promise to pay. But the contract explicitly details
the penalty for nonpayment — surrender of the property. The borrower isn’t escaping the consequences; he
is suffering them.
In some states, lenders also have recourse to the borrowers’ unmortgaged assets, like their car and savings
accounts. A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond found that defaults are lower in such states,
apparently because lenders threaten the borrowers with judgments against their assets. But actual lawsuits
are rare.
And given that nearly a quarter of mortgages are underwater, and that 10 percent of mortgages are
delinquent, White, of the University of Arizona, is surprised that more people haven’t walked. He thinks the
desire to avoid shame is a factor, as are overblown fears of harm to credit ratings. Probably, homeowners
also labor under a delusion that their homes will quickly return to value. White has argued that the
government should stop perpetuating default “scare stories” and, indeed, should encourage borrowers to
default when it’s in their economic interest. This would correct a prevailing imbalance: homeowners operate
under a “powerful moral constraint” while lenders are busily trying to maximize profits. More important, it
might get the system unstuck. If lenders feared an avalanche of strategic defaults, they would have an
incentive to renegotiate loan terms. In theory, this could produce a wave of loan modifications — the very
goal the Treasury has been pursuing to end the crisis.
No one says defaulting on a contract is pretty or that, in a perfectly functioning society, defaults would be
the rule. But to put the onus for restraint on ordinary homeowners seems rather strange. If the Mortgage
Bankers Association is against defaults, its members, presumably the experts in such matters, might take
better care not to lend people more than their homes are worth.
Roger Lowenstein, an outside director of the Sequoia Fund, is a contributing writer for the magazine. His
book “The End of Wall Street” is coming out in April.
2 of 3
12/1/14, 1:30 PM
The Way We Live Now – Walk Away From Your Mortgage! – …
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/magazine/10FOB-wwln-t….
This article has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: January 10, 2010
An essay on Page 15 this weekend about underwater mortgages misstates the parties who believe their
homes will go up in value quickly. It is the homeowners — not the “mortgagees,” who issue mortgages.
Copyright 2010 The New York Times Company
Privacy Policy
3 of 3
Terms of Service
Search
Corrections
RSS
First Look
Help
Contact Us
Work for Us
Site Map
12/1/14, 1:30 PM
12/1/2014
My Reasons for the Pardons – The New York Times
This  copy  is  for  your  personal,  noncommercial  use  only.  You  can  order  presentation-­ready  copies  for  distribution
to  your  colleagues,  clients  or  customers,  please  click  here  or  use  the  “Reprints”  tool  that  appears  next  to  any
article.  Visit  www.nytreprints.com  for  samples  and  additional  information.  Order  a  reprint  of  this  article  now.  »
February  18,  2001
My  Reasons  for  the  Pardons
By  William  Jefferson  Clinton
Editors’ Note Appended
CHAPPAQUA,  N.Y.—  Because of the intense scrutiny and criticism of the pardons of Marc Rich and his partner Pincus Green and because legitimate concerns
have been raised, I want to explain what I did and why.
First, I want to make some general comments about pardons and commutations of sentences. Article II of the Constitution gives the president broad and
unreviewable power to grant ”Reprieves and Pardons” for all offenses against the United States. The Supreme Court has ruled that the pardon power is granted
”[t]o the [president] . . ., and it is granted without limit” (United States v. Klein). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that ”[a] pardon . . . is . . . the
determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by [the pardon] . . .” (Biddle v. Perovich). A president may conclude a pardon
or commutation is warranted for several reasons: the desire to restore full citizenship rights, including voting, to people who have served their sentences and lived
within the law since; a belief that a sentence was excessive or unjust; personal circumstances that warrant compassion; or other unique circumstances.
The exercise of executive clemency is inherently controversial. The reason the framers of our Constitution vested this broad power in the Executive Branch was to
assure that the president would have the freedom to do what he deemed to be the right thing, regardless of how unpopular a decision might be. Some of the uses
of the power have been extremely controversial, such as President Washington’s pardons of leaders of the Whiskey Rebellion, President Harding’s commutation of
the sentence of Eugene Debs, President Nixon’s commutation of the sentence of James Hoffa, President Ford’s pardon of former President Nixon, President
Carter’s pardon of Vietnam War draft resisters, and President Bush’s 1992 pardon of six Iran-contra defendants, including former Defense Secretary Weinberger,
which assured the end of that investigation.
On Jan. 20, 2001, I granted 140 pardons and issued 36 commutations. During my presidency, I issued a total of approximately 450 pardons and commutations,
compared to 406 issued by President Reagan during his two terms. During his four years, President Carter issued 566 pardons and commutations, while in the
same length of time President Bush granted 77. President Ford issued 409 during the slightly more than two years he was president.
The vast majority of my Jan. 20 pardons and reprieves went to people who are not well known. Some had been sentenced pursuant to mandatory-sentencing drug
laws, and I felt that they had served long enough, given the particular circumstances of the individual cases. Many of these were first-time nonviolent offenders
with no previous criminal records; in some cases, codefendants had received significantly shorter sentences. At the attorney general’s request, I commuted one
death sentence because the defendant’s principal accuser later changed his testimony, casting doubt on the defendant’s guilt. In some cases, I granted pardons
because I felt the individuals had been unfairly treated and punished pursuant to the Independent Counsel statute then in existence. The remainder of the
pardons and commutations were granted for a wide variety of fact-based reasons, but the common denominator was that the cases, like that of Patricia Hearst,
seemed to me deserving of executive clemency. Overwhelmin