Consider the following normal form game: 1/2 —-L———–R U—-(1,1)——-(-2,6) D—-(6,-2)——(-1,-1) What difference does it make if the game is played only once or is repeated an infinite number of times? Show that, with infinite repetitions, an average payoff pair (2, 2) can be obtained if the players alternate between two different strategy pairs. Show that the average payoffs (2, 2) are also enforceable if the players follow a simple trigger strategy.

Consider the following normal form game:

1/2 —-L———–R

U—-(1,1)——-(-2,6)

D—-(6,-2)——(-1,-1)

What difference does it make if the game is played only once or is
repeated an infinite number of times? Show that, with infinite
repetitions, an average payoff pair (2, 2) can be obtained if the
players alternate between two different strategy pairs. Show that the
average payoffs (2, 2) are also enforceable if the players follow a
simple trigger strategy.