Durkheim’s underdeveloped notion of fatalism is the keystone for a bridge between two conceptual categories central to Marxian and Durkheimian theory: alienation and anomie. Durkheim does not necessarily disagree with Marx that excessive regulation can be socially damaging but chooses to highlight the effects of underregulation. A Durkheimian critique of overregulation becomes possible if we turn away from anomie and toward Durkheim’s idea of fatalism-a concept that I will argue here is unexpectedly consistent with Marx’s notion of alienation. We can infer that Durkheim presents us with a notion of an “optimal” human condition that exists between anomie and fatalism. The structure of modern societies, it will be argued, is characterized not just by excessive control leading to alienation or by a lack of integrative restraint leading to anomie but also by active efforts to optimally regulate social life.

Durkheim sides with Hobbes and Freud where Marx sides with Rousseau and the Utopians. The classic theorists, each in their distinctive way, articulate contrasting, competing, and at times complementary theories of social order and human essence. In their collective intellectual achievements, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber offered not only profound criticisms of industrialization and the rise of capitalism but also developed abstract, yet socially grounded, conceptions of human nature. This article will concern itself with three particular concepts relating to human experience from two of the classic founders. I argue that one underappreciated concept from Emile Durkheim-the notion of fatalism-is the keystone for a bridge between two prominent conceptual categories central to Marxian and Durkheimian theory: alienation and anomie. Durkheim offers a theory of optimal social regulation that is more compelling than Marx’s one-sided depiction of the alienated worker who is lost and adrift in an increasingly mechanized society. Durkheim, instead, presents us with the possibility of an empirical middle ground that exists between the margins of anomie and fatalism. Consequently, Durkheim offers us a multidimensional context from which to understand social regulation in modern societies, and he therefore proposes a framework that is able to account for more of the social world than Marx’s theory of alienation can.

In order to fully understand the implications of Durkheim’s hidden contribution, we must come to terms with the binary nature of his anomic-fatalistic distinction. Unlike Marx’s understanding of alienation-which I will argue here is quite unexpectedly consistent with the concept of fatalism-Durkheim offers two distinct concepts that offer the potential for a more complete evaluation of empirical social conditions. Durkheim’s theory of social life is not, as some have argued, somehow irrevocably at odds with Marx’s vision of widespread alienation (see, for instance, Lukes 1967) but instead emerges only when we turn away from anomie and toward Durkheim’s idea of fatalism. Such an intellectual move allows for a Durkheimian critique of overregulation-a theoretical position that has been overshadowed by Durkheim’s emphasis on anomie and likewise by the Marxist critique of capitalism’s overregulating tendencies. We can then infer that Durkheim does indeed present us an “optimal” condition that exists between anomie and fatalism and that comes to light under conditions of well-balanced societal regulation. Furthermore, Durkheim does not disagree with Marx that excessive regulation can be socially damaging or dismiss the possibility of overregulation but rather chooses to highlight the social effects of underregulation-anomie. In other words, the sin is not one of omission but of emphasis.

BRINGING FATALISM BACK IN

Alienation and anomie each represent distinct approaches to the study of what can be described as a social psychology of societal regulation. Each concept seeks to explain the pathological states of mind that arise from particular social relations present in highly differentiated social systems. Although anomie and alienation have each received considerable attention in the scholarly literature (see, for instance, Sikkink 1999; Mestrovic 1987; Sciulli 1984; Archibald 1978; Seeman 1975; Marks 1974; Wilson 1971; Blauner 1964),1 the same cannot be said for Durkheim’s brief discussion of fatalism and fatalistic suicide. It is fair to say that with few notable exceptions and later evaluations of Durkheim’s suicide studies (Besnard 1993; Lockwood 1992: ch. 3 and 307-11; Bearman 1991; Pearce 1989: ch. 6; Taylor 1982; Douglas 1967; Dohrenwend 1959), Durkheim’s discussion of fatalism has been relegated to the margins of scholarly discussion. Consequently, before proceeding, a few introductory remarks pertaining to Durkheim’s use of the term fatalism are in order.

Lockwood (1992:38), for instance, has referred to Durkheim’s remarks on fatalism as Durkheim’s “hidden” theory of social order. And although scant attention has been paid to this facet of Durkheim’s thought-a situation that Durkheim is partly responsible for as he offers fatalism one obscure footnote in his classic work Suicide-it is fair to say that Durkheim did not dismiss the concept simply out of neglect but rather because of his perception that fatalistic suicide lacked a certain measure of empirical relevance. Therefore, in referring to fatalistic suicide, Durkheim contends “that for completeness sake, we should set up a fourth suicidal type.” On the other hand, for Durkheim (1968:276), fatalistic suicide “has so little contemporary importance and examples are so hard to find . . . that it seems useless to dwell upon it.”

But should we take at face value Durkheim’s uncertain stipulation that fatalism should be assigned the status of empirical anachronism? Or could it be that Durkheim’s analytical commitments compel him to overlook the wider implications of fatalism as an existent social condition and to thus treat fatalism as more of a residual category? While a complete treatment of these questions is beyond the scope of the present article, a few words considering Durkheim’s discounting of fatalism are in order and will be briefly taken up here.

To begin, there is reason to suspect that Durkheim’s failure to articulate a fuller and more robust theory of fatalism hinges on his broad theoretical lens where well-regulated, mechanically solidaristic societies are understood as the exemplary archetype of the modern nation-state. As Bellah has noted, Durkheim’s (1973:xli) prescriptive strategy for a secular French republic hinged on the formation of a national morality that was to be “[disciplined, firm, with a definite sense of authority.” In this and other works, Durkheim (1973) presents himself as the conservative champion of the status quo who warns against “[t]he anarchist, the aesthete, the mystic, the social revolutionary” who in Durkheim’s view “have in common with the pessimist a single sentiment of hatred and disgust for the existing order, a single craving to destroy or escape from reality.” In this view, social change through sudden revolutionary or prophetic means runs counter to the Durkheimian vision of collective discipline, restraint, and self-control (see, for instance, Bellah 1973:xxxix). And in a concise yet thorough overview of Durkheim’s intellectual legacy and multifaceted scholarship. Smith and Alexander (2004:7) refer to “[t]he conservative Durkheim [who] talks about stability, legitimacy, democratic law, and social conformity, not only as empirical realities but also as ideals for the construction of a good society.”

Such analytical and quite politically burdened commitments may have made it difficult if not impossible for Durkheim to fathom a world of modernity where overregulation might account for social pathologies such as suicide. After all, why would fatalism be a problematic feature of modern social life when it is the very authority and regulation that fatalism represents that Durkheim finds as fundamental to the healthy maintenance of the modern, industrial social order? And is it not the case that in Suicide Durkheim all but discounts the possibility of overregulated social actors such as peasants and laborers being anything other than well regulated? It is possible to concede that Durkheim’s theoretical agenda was clouded by his inability to “see” the fatalism of the world around him and that this inability, at least in part, accounts for Durkheim’s awkward treatment of the concept.

Whatever Durkheim’s rationale for dismissing the concept, however, I would argue that fatalism, while clearly an underspecified idea, gains a measure of explanatory utility when we consider the implications of the concept by way of its binary opposite-anomie. Much like his powerful dichotomous construct of the sacred and profane, it is through the binary nature of the anomie-fatalism scheme that we can gain a fuller understanding of issues related to social underregulation (and the subsequent anomie condition), social over-regulation (and the subsequent fatalistic condition), and social order and social pathology.

With this in mind then, let us consider that terse and somewhat furtive footnote found in Suicide, where Durkheim added to his categorization of anomie, egoistic, and altruistic suicide by classifying fatalistic suicides as those suicides that occur when individuals experience severe and lingering duress that leads to a sense of utter hopelessness. Here, Durkheim clearly intended the concept to function as the binary opposite of his anomie suicide. Recall that anomie suicides occur when the power of the collective sanction is replaced with excessive freedom and choice and an accompanying loss of faith in moral guidelines and directives. It is within the context of such a societal setting-where the independent actor no longer fears the chastisement of the community that had previously followed him or her even after death-that suicidal acts are made possible.

Fatalism, on the other hand, captures experiences in environments where there is total coercion over the individual. It facilitates the taking of one’s own life at a moment of utter desperation. In a fascinating discussion of Durkheim’s fatalism concept, Lockwood (1992:38) has pointed out, “[i]f anomie means that horizons become abruptly widened so that aspirations know no bounds, fatalism refers to hopes so narrowed and diminished that even life itself becomes a matter of indifference.” These individuals, as Durkheim reasoned, experience such an intense and oppressive form of regulation that a coherent belief in human agency to bring about social change is simply not possible. Durkheim’s use of slavery as one empirical example of such a fatalistic persuasion reinforces the sense that this is a worldview that is structured around the existence of a dominating external coercive structure. As such, Durkheim (1968:276) causally links suicides that are a consequence of fatalistic outlooks to “futures [that are] pitilessly blocked and passions violently choked by oppressive discipline.” In a brief discussion informed by Durkheim’s interpretation of the fatalistic slave mentality, Pearce (1989:129) puts it this way: “[I]t is likely that in the period prior to the Civil War the outlook of many slaves was fatalistic-the conditions under which they lived seemed to be ‘unavoidable facts of life’ and no alternative seemed conceivable.” The sense of fatalism here is best described as one associated with feelings of personal helplessness and vulnerability, resulting from an overwhelming external force that has a total control over personal action. Durkheim’s analogy of slavery can thus be extended to the fatalism experienced by prisoners in concentration camps, maximum-security prisons, asylums, and possibly to settings where the existence of violent coercion is less immediate but equally discouraging such as within Native American reservations.

As noted above, Durkheim offered only a superficial analysis of fatalism. To some, this analytical shortcoming is compounded by Durkheim’s use of empirical examples that lack a concrete historical context and that border on the anecdotal. “[Durkheim’s] discussion of the concept of ‘fatalistic suicide’ was,” as Pearce (1989:129) reasons, “overly cryptic and his examples though seemingly empirical, were in fact abstract, since he did not use concrete historical or social data . . . In other words, Durkheim’s discussion of fatalistic suicide is itself incoherent and the category itself needs to be reformulated.”

There remains, however, a purely analytical value in focusing on these “cryptic” remarks and placing them in a broader context. If we are to clearly understand Durkheim’s fatalism, it should be understood that the reference point for fatalism is its binary opposite: anomie. The fatalism concept gains in coherence and clarity when it is understood, prima facia, and much like Durkheim’s theory of anomie, as a component in a wider, systematic theory of social regulation.2 And finally, as we will see below, we can credit Marx, through his more complete elaboration of alienation, with offering us a fuller understanding of fatalism than is found in Durkheim.

FILLING IN DURKHEIM’S BLANKS: THE FATALISM OF MARX’S ALIENATION

In an early article, Steven Lukes dismisses interpretations of alienation that have drifted away from Marx’s initial conceptualization of the term and offers us an analysis of alienation that is true to Marx’s original intended usage of the word. Unknowingly, Lukes also sheds light on the parallels between alienation and fatalism. For Lukes, Marx characterized alienation as a cognitive state that occurs in response to the inequitable interactions that take place within the dehumanizing constraints of the capitalist labor process, and in his article, he cites four aspects of alienation that are true to Marx’s intended usage of the term. These refer to sociopsychological conditions that cannot be removed from their dependence on economic relations and include:

(1) “the relationship of the worker to the product of labor as an alien object which dominates him” (2) “the relationship of labour to the act of product ion” with the result that “the work is external to the worker, that it is not part of his nature” (3) [t]he alienation of man from himself as a “species being,” from “his own active function, his life activity,” which is “free conscious activity.” (4) The alienation of man “from other men”… [In this sense] [sjocial relations “are not relations between individual and individual, but between worker and capitalist, between farmer and landlord, etc.” (Lukes 1967:137, italics in original)

Here, Lukes shows how Marx frames alienation as a correlate of powerlessness. Individuals are deprived psychologically of the capacity to will their own destinies and as such are compelled by external forces to fill positions in the social order that are not of their choosing. Consequently, for Lukes (1967:138, italics added), “Marx’s sociopsychological hypothesis concerning alienation is that it increases in proportion to the growing division of labor under capitalism, where men are forced to confine themselves to performing specialized functions within a system they neither understand or control.” The key point to note here is the element of external regulation that Lukes finds present in Marx’s alienation concept. The explanatory power of the concept derives from its ability to predict a pathological cognitive state that is a function of the level of external constraint placed upon the individual. And while themes of regulation are generally associated with Durkheim’s thought, it is evident from these passages that for Marx, alienation-as a consequence of capitalist economic relations-was not only a function of overregulation but also a complementary evil associated with the increasing division of labor that characterized industrial capitalism.

This theme is also evident in other of Marx’s writings where alienation takes a remarkably, and underappreciated, fatalistic tone. And here is where another central point needs to be addressed. The passages below will show how Marx’s alienation serves as a powerful complement to Durkheim’s scant discussion of fatalism and the social conditions that give rise to the fatalistic mindset. In other words, where Durkheim fails to adequately specify the empirical origins and implications of fatalism. Marx can help fill in some of the blanks.

Take, for instance, the following passage from the German Ideology, where alienation is described as rooted in the inequalities inherent in the capitalist division of labor and also presented as a cognitive condition that can best be described as complete helplessness-a typical indicator of the fatalist personality. We can also note here how Marx’s use of the word “enslavement” foreshadows Durkheim’s eventual use of “the slave” as an empirical example of the ultra-fatalistic social actor.

The division of labor offers us the first example of the fact that, as long as man remains in naturally evolved society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntary, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the division of labor comes upon him, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. (Marx and Engels 1976:47, italics added)

In a comparable passage, Marx’s description takes on an even more immediate and almost mystically fatalistic character in which the foundation of alienation becomes the fatalistic mindset. In a characteristically impassioned critique of “the social power” that is the capitalist division of labor, Marx contrasts the romanticized social actor who is able to “become accomplished in any branch he wishes” (Marx and Engels 1976:47) and therefore voluntarily cooperates in the production of society’s resources, with the alienated (fatalistic) social actor who under capitalism does not volunteer in the production of social goods, understanding fully well that the act of cooperation is

not their own united power, but [understood] as an alien force existing outside them, the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus are no longer able to control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay being the prime governor of these. (Marx and Engels 1976:48, italics added)

As a consequence, for Marx, the central problem of society is the problem of a social order that is shaped by excessive regulation: a theme that resonates with Durkheim’s concerns about fatalism.

We should be cautious, however, not to overly conflate fatalism with alienation. While alienation is, for Marx at least, exclusively tied to the capitalist order, Durkheim’s fatalism concept does not hinge solely on the character of economic relations. Instead, Durkheim expands his concept beyond the economic realm to include more micro-level spheres of social life: marriage and child bearing. Durkheim’s (1968:276) complementary empirical example of fatalism that is experienced by “very young husbands [and] the married woman who is childless” points to nonmaterial sources of regulation that impact social actors.

This being said, the example of slaves who are overly regulated stands in stark contrast to the meaninglessness of the anomic condition where individuals feel they are not integrated into the greater whole of society. When we turn anomie on its head and focus on the fuller implications of its binary opposite, it then becomes possible to expand on the limited empirical possibilities of the fatalism concept that Durkheim proposed (see, for instance, Besnard 2004, particularly pp. 3-4). We can then consider that for some workers, capitalism may be a source of mental “slavery”: a condition where work is so monotonous and brutish, and the worker’s “futures pitilessly blocked” that the end result is a fatalistic outlook on life (see, for instance, Bacharach, Bamberger, and Sonnenstuhl 2002; Braverman 1998; Burawoy 1982).

It should also be understood that Marx’s alienation not only addresses a specific cognitive reaction to social structure but that it is also predicated upon a corresponding view of human essence. Central to Marx’s thesis is the claim that social structure impedes the innately creative and aesthetically curious dimensions of human nature. Capitalism imposes an external force whereby humans live in what Marx called “self-denial”: a form of abstinence from the material things of the world that most resonate with our creative essence. In referencing the contrast between such natural desires and those imposed upon us by the demands of political economy, Marx remarked,

self denial [is] the denial of life and of all human needs… The less you eat, drink and read books; the less you go to the theatre, the dance hall, the public house; the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you save-the greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor dust will devour-your capital. (Marx and Engels 1978:95-96, italics in original)

This critical appraisal presumes a fundamental optimism about human nature. Social structures have inhibited the natural constitution of human agency that we retain by controlling our life activity. The basis for such a perspective has its roots in Rousseau’s noble savage mythology and highlights Marx’s Utopian tendency to reduce human nature to an exaggerated state of purity and innocence. In keeping with Rousseau’s challenge to Augustine’s medieval Christian theology, Marx’s conception of alienation counters the traditional Christian conception of human nature as primordially depraved and sinful. Human beings are, from a Marxian point of view, complete when they are unregulated and uninhibited and are only later corrupted by the presence of oppressive social forces.

Regardless of its origins then, it is clear that Marx’s understanding of alienation cannot be removed from his overall confidence in human nature. Alienation was for Marx a social evil in that it afflicts a species that in effect has no need for external regulation. The human condition can produce happiness and equilibrium without social constraint. As such, human beings are not a problem but the social order is.

Marx was implying that the separation of the individual from his or her species being is the equivalent of separating human beings from their innate human essence. Implicit here is a theory of human nature in which the condition of personhood is associated with two essential components. First, human nature is rooted in the freedom to control one’s life activity. Second, the result of this personal empowerment is the ability to see others as full persons and not through the lens of capitalism. As has been accurately stated, for Marx, “[a]lienated man is dehumanized by being conditioned and constrained to see himself, his products, his activities and other men in economic, political, religious and other categories-in terms which deny his and their human possibilities” (Lukes 1967:140). Alienation is a consequence of social relations that deny our innate desires for autonomous action, that dehumanize individuals to the point of absolute degradation, and that emphasize the constraining qualities of capitalist production. Fittingly, Lukes (1967:143) has argued that at the core of Marx’s intellectual mission was a desire to illustrate the potential for a complete and just level of human development that could occur when “neither the natural nor the social environment are constraining.” Hence, the key to alienation is overregulation.

At this point, one could argue that alienation is in conceptual tension with anomie as both pathological conditions arise out of opposing structural conditions: alienation from the merciless and degrading rule of the capitalist order; anomie from the excessive individual freedom and lack of moral control that is an extension of the capitalist order. On first glance, it is evident that Marx and Durkheim indeed offer opposing accounts of social regulation with Marx maintaining a strict anti-institutional perspective and Durkheim stressing regulation as the impetus for the balanced collective life. “Social constraint,” as Lukes (1967:142) reasserts, “is for Marx a denial and for Durkheim a condition of human freedom and self-realization.” Then again, it is my view that such criticisms overlook the powerful relational qualities of Durkheim’s suicide typologies because it is in the binary opposite to anomie-that being fatalism-that Durkheim offers as an illustration of a collective cognitive pathology that emerges as a consequence of excessive regulation.

DURKHEIM, ANOMIE, AND THE LOSS OF MORAL REGULATION

Like alienation, Durkheim’s concept of anomie corresponds to a distinct conception of human nature and human essence. But Durkheim, I would like to suggest, offers a broader conception of human nature than Marx. Here, human beings are not the active yet noble creatures that Rousseau and Marx make them out to be but rather creatures endowed with certain potentials for either good or evil. Human beings are “open” to distinct outcomes depending on the type of social regulation they encounter. Consequently, they are not innately noble poets, musicians, or artists, but rather units of analysis who respond to the forces of the social and therefore require a well-regulated social system.

What is present in Durkheim’s earlier writings is an attempt to reconcile the complexities of human cognition with diverse levels of social regulation. In his early study on the social psychology of suicide, for instance, one of Durkheim’s major premises-that suicide is a function of variant levels of social integration and that suicides result from the existence of particular cognitive states-corresponds with the comprehensive view of human nature outlined above. Similarly, in one of the few theoretical treatments of Durkheim’s suicide typologies to include even a cursory discussion of fatalism, Dohrenwend (1959) has pointed out that it is particularly in the egoism concept that Durkheim demonstrates his underlying conception of human nature. As Dohrenwend (1959:468, italics in original) argues, “when Durkheim characterizes the norm-state of egoism as consisting of ‘excessive individualism,’… use of the adjective ‘excessive’ is related to his assumption that it is human nature for the individual to need a goal larger than himself.”

What Dohrenwend fails to point out, however, is the possibility that Durkheim offers a more complex depiction of human nature. Durkheim does not presume that humans are by nature self-interested egoists but rather that we may be inclined to seek self-interest when societal conditions are conducive for such behavior. The Durkheimian view of human nature originates with his intricate and dualistic homo duplex theory whereby human beings are torn between their selfish, biological, and individualistic desires and the weight of the their rationalistic, moral, and inevitably societal expectations (see also Shilling and Mellor 1998:195-97). As Durkheim (1973:151) tells us, “[o]ur intelligence, like our activity presents two very different forms: on the one hand, are sensations and sensory tendencies, on the other, conceptual thought and moral activity.” As Durkheim (1973:157) sees it, this acute tension accounts for the “suffering” that human beings-as the only absolute social animal-place upon themselves “[b]ecause these two worlds are naturally opposed, they struggle within us; and because we are part of both, we are necessarily in conflict with our selves.”

In fact, for Durkheim, human beings are distinct from other animal organisms because of the human actor’s evident inability to self-regulate desire. In animals, for instance, the tension between desire and the means to fulfill that desire is mitigated by the tendency of equilibrium in the animal kingdom to be reached by purely material mechanisms. “In the animal, at least in normal condition, this equilibrium is established with automatic spontaneity because the animal depends on purely material conditions” (Durkheim 1968:246).

On the other hand, human nature is, for Durkheim, something altogether distinct and more elusive than the biologically determined actions of animals. The fulfillment of human desires is a largely subjective and quite inexhaustible enterprise. Human nature thus dictates that social actors exercise agency in determining the most favorable level of perceived satisfaction.

Strictly speaking, we may consider that the quantity of material supplies necessary to the physical maintenance of a human life is subject to computation, though this be less exact than that in the preceding case [of animals] and a wider margin left for free will; for beyond the indispensable minimum which satisfies nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection suggests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends craving fulfillment… But how determine the quantity of well-being, comfort or luxury legitimately to be craved by a human being? Nothing appears in man’s organic nor in his psychological constitution which sets a limit to such tendencies. (Durkheim 1968:247)

Anomie and fatalism thus relate to the margins of human passions and the extreme forms of social structure that each condition addresses. Anomie is a condition that knows no limits where, alternatively, the passions of the fatalist are unmistakably constrained and “pitilessly blocked” by the enduring burden of overregulation. The introduction of egoism and altruism completes Durkheim’s complex portrait of human nature and allows for a more complete evaluation of the human condition.

But what does this say about human nature and does such an appraisal apply collectively to all social actors, as any argument on human nature would dictate? Durkheim (1968:247) responds to this query when he states unequivocally, “human nature is substantially the same among all men, in its essential qualities” and it is not an intrinsic part of human nature to “assign the variable limits necessary to our needs.” And so unlike Marx, Durkheim (1968:247-48) is not convinced that human actors will be content as free-producing poets, artists, or philosophers but rather that “human activity naturally aspires beyond assignable limits and sets itself unattainable goals.” In my view, Durkheim (1968:247) is not a pessimist here but rather understands the complexities of human cognition and he notes that human passions and desires can only be contained by societal control so that “[irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss.”

One underlying principle for Marx’s conception of human essence may be found in Rousseau and other Utopian models in which human nature is uncontaminated and benign while it is “external authority, and restraint [that are] an offence against reason and an attack upon freedom” (Lukes 1967:145). Yet, we should not overstate the Hobbsian quality apparent in Durkheim’s conception of human nature and by extension assume that Durkheim is incapable of addressing compulsive and oppressive social conditions. To do so is to neglect the binary character of Durkheim’s thought process and, as a result, ignore the potential of Durkheim’s theory of fatalistic suicide to encompass the fact that structural forces can, and often do, estrange, subjugate-or stated another way-alienate the individual.

The erroneous assumption here is that Durkheim’s theory stops at anomie and that he could not conceive of regulatory structural conditions that might deprive social actors of their humanity. In fact, because it is Marx who neglects the possibility of an anomie state, it would seem that it is Marx’s romanticized vision that does not offer a realistic and pragmatic possibility of optimal social regulation. It is Marx who is unable to theorize a cognitive state other than alienation as dominant in the social structure of modern, capitalist society. It is in Durkheim, on the other hand, where the possibilities of optimally regulated social relations-those that are somewhere between anomie and fatalism-are to be found.

Durkheim’s close attention to the opposing possibilities of human action and social structure open up the possibility for a more nuanced and balanced theory of social regulation. In the four social currents discussed in Suicide and in the Division of Labor, Durkheim implicitly sets up an elegant and almost geometrical four-part schema of opposing social conditions and collective mindsets (for an intriguing discussion on Durkheim’s geometrical schema, see Besnard 2004). However, as he also tells us, extremes are often merely empirical guideposts that are, in my view, analogous to Weber’s ideal types. “Absolute egoism, like absolute altruism, is an ideal limit which can never be attained in reality. Both are states that we can approach indefinitely without ever realizing them completely” (Durkheim 1973:153). This assumes then that we are capable of a condition that is removed from the extremes and that is grounded in the optimal form of social regulation and its accompanying collective mindset. In other words, if Durkheim proposes these “ideal limits,” he is surely aware that an optimal condition within the margins of these limits (between fatalism and anomie, for instance) can be attained.

BETWEEN FATALISM AND ANOMIE: OPTIMAL REGULATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF MODERN SOCIETY

While modern life must somehow be characterized by either reified or disintegrated social structures, we could mistakenly assume that neither Marx nor Durkheim offers a complete account that encompasses both possibilities as tangible elements of social life. The error of such an account is in assuming that we must independently turn to both Marx and Durkheim for sociologically relevant theories of overregulation and underregulation when Durkheim’s binary model already provides us with a template to do just that. Modern society is not only an ad hoc amalgamation of alienation and anomie but rather can be understood as the regulated incorporation of anomie and fatalism. Consequently, a fundamental characteristic of modern society is the effort to realize an optimal regulation of human life. And although such attempts are rarely successful, achieving a balance between fatalism and anomie seems to be one goal, among many, of modern individuals and modern institutions.

Essentially, Durkheim offers a vision of optimal regulation and has the idea of anomie, but can be faulted in that he regrettably never fully developed what he meant by fatalism. Marx, on the other hand, can be read as coming to the rescue because he tells us what fatalism might actually look like-at least in the context of capitalist production relationships. What this article has addressed is the possibility of a more complete understanding of the Durkheimian view of social order and regulation. Because we are not restricted to anomie states as the only conceivable outcome of an increased division of labor, bringing Durkheim’s fatalism back into focus allows us to account for a more plausible fit between theory and empirical circumstances. In other words, a Durkheimian approach allows for the possibility of an optimal balance between overregulation and underregulation in modern, industrial society. At the same time, we can also begin to appreciate, sociologically, the particular regulatory features of advanced capitalism that Marx either overlooked or could not have predicted.

The 20th century has and continues to present us illustrations of totalitarianism and forms of governmental control whose excesses have been borne out in the needless costs of countless lives. The 21st century has ushered in a new era of conflict that is once again rooted in debates over principles of regulation, control, and freedom. In this sense, the theoretical concerns of sociology’s founders resonate with the very structure of modern societies. We are also left to contend with the legacy of social philosophers from Hobbes to Machiavelli and on to the founders of American democracy who sought to reconcile the limits of government with what they perceived as the innate constitution of human nature. What Durkheim offers is a pragmatic rather than heroic appraisal of societal regulation and the rewards and limits of regulatory mechanisms in modern societies. For if social actors can be subject to both ineffectual social structures that encourage anomie or to coercive forces that give rise to fatalistic outlooks, then it stands to reason that Durkheim anticipated the possibility of a form of regulation whose aim is the balance between the two.

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Social manifestation is a stronger factor to the health care status of a place. Therefore, region with multiracial setup are privy to such disparities in the healthcare provisions, and this has remained a big challenge for significantly longer duration. One such lens for comparison is the impact of cardiovascular diseases in the Town Fort Lauderdale, which is a multiethnic society majorly dominated by the African-American population (Andrews, & Boyle, 2008). The most important lens of examination is how community resources assisted living play key roles in promoting livelihood and healthcare status of this population, who are associated with higher rates of vulnerabilities.

There are several ways that the society could be empowered to fight against the cardiovascular disease, and this is not limited to the conventional hospital or nursing care services. Therefore, the extent of resource mobilization would determine the livelihood and the health status of the population here, and how they cope with the severe cardiovascular disease.

In order to have a clear picture of the healthcare situation in the Town Fort Lauderdale, it is idea; to have a clear data collection method on this vice, which seemingly impinges most people. Therefore, this study will anchor on survey to the African-American population living in this area, and to determine the extent of resource mobilization, as well as care for its population with cardiovascular diseases. In addition, the survey will target the sample population of those affected with the disease, and control group who are well. The comparison of care and treatment accorded to this people will be predictive of the how well the society cares for the cardiovascular disease infested population compared to the rest of the population who might be suffering from other illnesses. Thus, the key issue is to have this framework where the population is subjected to a survey on the parameters like community resources, assisted living to the people suffering from cardiovascular diseases……….